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The hegemonic copyright-regime vs. the 
sharing copyright users of music? 
 
Bart Cammaerts 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this commentary the increasing discrepancy between the emerging participatory 
networked culture and the hegemonic copyright and intellectual property regime is 
contextualised and subsequently problematised. While this is a feature and growing conflict 
for every form of authored work – news, films, books, academic work, photography, the 
focus here is on music and more in particular on the sharing of music. Sharing music is not a 
new phenomenon, but current copyright users share music with weak peers in addition to 
strong peers which has taken sharing to a whole different level reminiscent of a gift-culture, 
but with less need for reciprocity. Music audiences attribute less value to a digital product 
than to an artefact such as a CD or vinyl record. The reaction of the music industry to these 
phenomena has been hostile up until now, criminalising the copyright user and lobbying for 
the close monitoring of the online behaviour of all internet users. However, while the industry 
foregrounds its potential losses based on the number of downloads, as well as the difficulties 
this provokes for young beginning artists, others are pointing towards the societal benefits of 
worldwide free access to such a wide variety of music. Furthermore, several counter-voices in 
the copyright debate have emerged, from copyleft to copyriot and more and more artists 
mainstream and alternative are engaging fully with the participatory culture. In this 
commentary an argument is developed in favour of the music industry embracing this 
participatory networked culture rather than take us back to the future of 1984. Democracy 
and civic liberties are more important than the corporate interests of a few. 
 
Wordcount:  
 
4961 (Refs and Notes Included) 
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The hegemonic copyright-regime vs. the 
sharing copyright users of music? 
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
The tensions between the current hegemonic copyright regime and new 
patterns of consumption and use of music has engendered a lot of debate in 
academia, amongst legal scholars, corporate actors and in the media. 
Digitalisation, compression techniques and the internet as a potent 
distribution tool have provided the music industry tremendous benefits in 
terms of reducing production, reproduction and distribution costs, but at the 
same time these technologies have also a deterritorialising effect, 
undermining the current stringent copyright and intellectual property regime.  
 
While the industry still clings on to a past when music symbolised at the same 
time an artefact – a physical material product, music audiences have long 
moved on and differentiate in the value they attribute to a digital product 
compared to a physical product, even if the content is the same. Sharing 
music, which is not an entirely new phenomenon, has shifted from strong-
peers to weak peers enabled by networked technologies. We have also 
entered an era in which music plays a different role in people’s everyday life, 
is more ephemeral - ‘its duration becomes compressed, and it becomes more 
of a process than a finished product’ (Terranova, 2000: 48). Music has 
become ubiquitous through mobile devices and the internet and quantity is 
often more important than quality. As a result of all this and despite all the 
frantic efforts by the industry to put a stop to the downloading and sharing of 
copy-right protected music, music audiences are less and less willing to pay 
for the music they listen to (Molteni and Ordanini, 2003; Leyshon et al., 
2005).  
 
What we are witnessing here is a good illustration of the widening of the gap 
between what is called le pays legal and le pays réel, between the laws and 
regulations put in place by the state and what is deemed to be acceptable 
and normal behaviour on the part of citizens/consumers. This growing 
discrepancy between the legal and the everyday world in relation to music is 
explored further by first outlining the nature of the hegemonic copyright 
regime and its gradual universalisation as well as expansion, both in scope 
and in duration. After this, new patterns of sharing music that challenge this 
hegemonic copyright regime will be addressed to then focus on the tactics of 
the industry to discipline these practices. Finally, counter-voices in the 
intellectual property and copyright debate advocating for a strengthening of 
the public domain will be outlined.  
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The hegemonic copyright regime 
 
Historically, old folk culture did not recognise ownership of culture – 
‘performance was regarded more highly than authorship’ (Söderberg, 2002: 
np). Cultures thrived on the sharing of stories that got adapted, transformed, 
but could not be traced back anymore to a single author. Foucault (1986: 
108) points out that discourse was not ‘a product, a thing, a kind of goods’.  
 
The first formalisation of copyright and authorship can be situated in 1710 
when the Statute of Anne - An Act for the Encouragement of Learning - was 
voted in the UK (Rimmer, 2007: 4). It enabled authors to exert their rights on 
newly produced work and gave them the exclusive rights to print and sell 
their work for a finite time span, with a maximum of 28 years if the author 
was still alive. The Statute of Anne created a public domain for literature and 
sought to strike a balance between the advancement of knowledge and 
incentives for the creation and creators of culture; it was a social contract in 
sorts (Deazley, 2004). Limits on the duration of copyright protection were put 
in place to promote and protect the public domain as much as the author.  
 
Intellectual property and copyright protection was subsequently slowly but 
surely universalised through a number of conventions and binding 
agreements. The Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property 
in 1883, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic 
Works in 1886, the establishment of World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) in 1967, and the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS) in 1995 were all geared up to universalize intellectual 
property and copyright protection. The universalisation of copyright protection 
is also at the core of the ideology of free and fair trade embedded in the 
GATT and the WTO (Bettig, 1996). Legal copyright protection became the 
cornerstone and prime vehicle through which the commodification of culture – 
‘the process of transforming use values into exchange values’ (Mosco, 1996: 
141) – has been institutionalised and enforced. 
 
Two historical trends can be identified. The first observable trend is that the 
copyright regime has been gradually expanded from pure texts and print to 
encompass any possible form of cultural production – paintings, engravings, 
photographs, music, film, broadcasts, theatre, etc. Most national/regional 
copyright laws and international agreements have also been updated to 
include the latest forms of digital reproduction and creation. In this regard 
can be referred to the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act in the US and 
the 2001 European Union Copyright Directive.  
 
A second marked trend is the considerable extension of the duration of 
copyright entitlements on cultural products in recent decades (see figure 1). 
One of its ground rules of The Berne convention established that copyright 
holders could assert their rights for a minimum term of the lifetime of the 
author plus 50 years. Initially the US did not sign up to the Berne convention. 
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In subsequent decades the US overtook Europe in terms of the prime 
advocate for copyright protection in order to protect the interests of their 
entertainment industry. Of great importance here is the distinction between 
authors’ copyright and corporate copyright1. Since 1993 in Europe a general 
rule was adopted, namely 70 years after an author’s death (Von Hielmcrone, 
2000: 31). In the US, The 1998 Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), also 
dubbed the Sonny Bono or Mickey Mouse Protection Act, drastically extended 
copyright protection in the US from 50 to 70 after the author’s life, in line with 
the EU directive, but the terms for corporate ownership or ‘work for hire’ were 
raised to 120 years after creation or 95 years after publication. (Rimmer, 
2007) 
 
 
Figure 1: Overview of changes in the terms for copyright protection in 
UK/Europe and in US from 1710-20102 
 
Source: made by the author, based on legal changes over this period in 
Europe and the US 
 
 
New forms of sharing music: the peer2peer model 
 
The emergence of a more participatory consumption culture, freely sharing 
digital content online, makes that ‘the older legal and economic structures 
that insure commodification on the basis of authorship are disintegrating 
before our eyes’ (Poster, 2004: 421). At the core of this is the phenomenon of 
sharing digital content amongst (weak) peers.  
 
Whilst online file-sharing – or what Liebowitz (2006: 4) calls ‘anonymous file 
copying’ – is a relatively new phenomenon, sharing music as such is not. 
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Reel-to-reel tapes and music cassettes for example enabled the copying of 
music onto another format for many years. After the introduction of music 
cassettes to the consumer market in the 60s and 70s, ‘making a tape’ became 
commonplace and was for many conducive to discovering new music and 
making new (girl)friends (Frith, 1986). In this type of strong-tie sharing of 
music kinships, friends, school, the local youth-club, (local) radio stations 
and/or the local record store were highly influential as to which music 
teenagers and young adults were exposed to and shared amongst friends. 
However, sharing today is of an entirely different magnitude and nature. One 
might argue that we have entered an era of weak-tie sharing of music.  
 
Peer-to-peer file sharing is in a sense a potent illustration of the collective 
‘strength of very weak ties’ (Granovetter, 1983) in densely networked 
environments. The network structure as well as the global nature of the 
internet makes it possible to share among anonymous and invisible publics 
that are not connected in any other way besides sharing data online (Lessig, 
2004: 17). File-sharing technology has ‘facilitated much greater user 
participation in what had previously been an arcane “gift economy” 
dominated by enthusiasts and hobbyists’ (Currah, 2006: 443). 
 
In his classic anthropological study The Gift, Mauss (1950) sets forth a theory 
regarding gifts and the act of giving and closely relates this to the notion of 
reciprocity. S/he who gives, often expects something in return at some point 
and while this leads to a re-enforcement of social relations and cohesion, 
Mauss argues that this also ferments social dependencies and reproduces 
existing power relations. However, with the emergence of digital technologies 
and the internet, in combination with the strength of weak ties, the element 
of reciprocity, strong social ties and asymmetrical power relations, while still 
relevant, have become less of an issue or can partially be overcome (Kollock, 
1999: 223). Whether we share with a few or with thousands, millions even 
does not really matter that much in terms of transaction costs. This also 
explains some of the differences between the act of giving in a material world 
as described by Mauss and giving in an immaterial peer-to-peer model. 
 
According to the international industry lobby groups, the music industry and 
the artists lost out on more than 40 Billion US$ in revenue in 2008 because of 
piracy and (illegal) file-sharing. Besides this, they estimate that 95% of music 
being downloaded online constitute in fact illicit downloads (IFPI, 2009: 22). 
It is generally accepted that the projections of losses due to peer-to-peer 
sharing of music are greatly exaggerated by the lobby organisations 
(Ziemann, 2002, 2007; Liebowitz, 2006: 13). Despite this, the majority of 
(econometric) studies into file-sharing conclude that this activity is plainly 
rather than creatively destructive and has ‘brought significant harm to the 
recording industry’ (Liebowitz, 2006: 24) and is detrimental for the ‘creation 
of artistic work or innovation’ (Zetner, 2006: 65). 
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Disciplining tactics of the entertainment industries  
 
Precisely because ‘[t]he network doesn’t discriminate between the sharing of 
copyrighted and uncopyrighted content’ (Lessig 2004: 18), the entertainment 
industries’ lobby organisations, as well as some artists, are very adamant in 
their resistance against these ‘immaterial’ sharing-practices employed by 
copyright users, which they depict as illegal piracy and blatant theft. The 
main tactics currently being enacted by the entertainment industries are 
three-fold:  
 
(1) protection  
(2) education and intimidation 
(3) repression 
 
Protection refers to Digital Rights Management (DRM) technologies, such as 
digital watermarks, as developed by the Secure Digital Music Initiative or 
Apple’s Fair Play DRM, which technically restricts the use of copyrighted 
content, both online and on devices such as MP3-players. These techniques 
have proven to be not that successful as hacks to circumvent protection are 
often quickly available and furthermore not all content producers use it on all 
their products. Apple calculated that on average under 3% of all content 
stored on iPods is DRM protected. This represents one of DRMs main 
weakness, according to Steve Jobs, CEO of Apple: 
 
DRMs haven’t worked, and may never work, to halt music piracy. 
Though the big four music companies require that all their music sold 
online be protected with DRMs, these same music companies continue 
to sell billions of CDs a year which contain completely unprotected 
music. […] the technical expertise and overhead required to create, 
operate and update a DRM system has limited the number of 
participants selling DRM protected music. (Jobs, 2007: np) 
 
A second tactic the industry employs is that of educating the masses and this 
refers to programs and campaigns that have been set-up to ‘close the 
“knowledge gap” between young people and their parents and teachers, in 
order to promote the safe and legal use of the internet and mobile phones to 
download music’ (IFPI, 2009: 26). However, many of these PR campaigns do 
not aim to educate, but above all to intimidate. Through the discourses being 
produced by lobby organisations in their PR-campaigns3 the criminalisation of 
the sharing copyright user is being articulated. On the website of the Alliance 
Against IP Theft (see Figure 2) illegal downloading and piracy is discursively 
and visually linked to drug dealing, sweatshops, child labour, illegal 
immigration and organised crime.  
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Figure 2: Screenshot of website of the Alliance Against IP Theft 
 
 
Source: http://www.allianceagainstiptheft.co.uk  
 
In recent years it became apparent that education and waving a stick was 
insufficient to deter the sharing of digital content. More radical strategies of 
repression were gradually enacted by the entertainment industries. First 
victims of their legal challenges were those facilitating the downloading and 
peer-to-peer sharing of digital content. A famous case in this regard was 
Napster, which was forced to close down and subsequently convert to a 
subscription model (McCourt and Burkhart, 2003). The pressure on MySpace 
and YouTube to remove copyrighted material from their sites and the gradual 
compliance of these sites to these requests certainly after having been 
appropriated by major players is another illustration of the attempts to assert 
the universal copyright hegemony online.  
 
As the internet was precisely designed to be versatile in adapting to and 
bypassing disruptions, new loopholes emerge very rapidly, making it near 
impossible for the content industries to keep up with innovations in terms of 
content distribution among peers and new ways of circumventing DRM 
protections. Different peer-to-peer sites and software applications are now 
available that do not require a central server anymore and are thus 
impossible to eliminate (e.g Kazaa, Limewire, Bit-Torrent). Blogs are 
increasingly used as a way to provide links to file-share sites such as 
RapidShare or Hotfile from where music or software can be downloaded.  
 
As a result of this, the entertainment industries re-directed their efforts to 
enforce copyright towards individual downloaders and sharers. Despite claims 
of the industry lobby organisations that they would only target ‘individual 
computer users who are illegally offering large amounts of copyrighted music 
 8 
over peer-to-peer networks’ (RIAA, 2009 – emphasis added), many cases 
being pursued by the RIAA do not fall into that category. According to the 
Electronic Freedom Foundation, the RIAA sued about 30.000 US individuals 
between 2003 and 2008; many of whom were not malign or severe users, but 
‘children, grandparents, unemployed single mothers, college professors’, 
having downloaded only a very limited number of music (EFF, 2008). Through 
high-profile cases the entertainment industry aims to scare internet users. 
This is confirmed by the comments of the lawyer of the RIAA in the case 
against Jamie Thomas, a single mother of two, who was convicted to pay 
220.000$ in damages to the RIAA for downloading and sharing 24 tracks: 
‘This does send a message, we hope, that both downloading and distributing 
music is not ok.’ (Richard Gabriel, quoted in Bangeman, 2007: np).  
 
The third and most recent actor being targeted by the entertainment 
industries are the Internet Service Providers (ISPs), considered to be complicit 
in copyright infringements by internet users. ISPs are increasingly asked to 
police and monitor their network and hand over information about the 
download behaviour of their customers (BBC, 2008). In the UK, the Digital 
Britain report, proposed to give the regulator Ofcom additional powers to 
force internet providers to report persistent misuse. (DCMS, 2009). Contrary 
to France, where the National Assembly narrowly stopped a stringent internet 
anti-piracy law disconnecting internet users after three infringements, as well 
as requiring them to keep paying their subscription (BBC, 2009), in the UK 
the fierce battle to curb illegal downloading or anonymous file-sharing of 
copyrighted content is opening the door to a state-sanctioned monitoring 
system of the internet usage of everyone and of the content that is being 
downloaded and/or shared.  
 
 
Counter-voices in the IP-debate 
 
As is apparent, other voices besides the music industry and governments are 
also active in this debate. One of the main counter-arguments distinguishes 
peer-to-peer sharing from piracy with a commercial intent. It is being argued 
that peer-to-peer sharing involves gaining a private benefit, while at the same 
time providing benefits to others, which above all takes place outside of the 
value-chain as no money is exchanged (Jenkins, 2003), very reminiscent to 
the discourses related to the culture of gifts.  
 
Lessig (2004: 201), one of the most influential voices in developing counter 
perspectives on copyright and a more participatory culture, argues that if the 
‘costs [of enforcing the law more severely], intended and collateral, do 
outweigh the benefits, then the law ought to be changed’. This should result 
in the emergence of different types of intellectual property regimes allowing 
for different degrees of freedom and above all establishing an intellectual and 
creative commons (Lessig, 2004: 204; Bollier, 2009).  
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There exist a variety of alternative copyright licences of which the 1989 
General Public License (GPL); also known as the Copyleft license (see figure 
3) and the 2002 Creative Commons ShareAlike licenses which were inspired 
by the GPL, are the most common. The GPL license was originally developed 
by Richard Stallman to suit the needs of the Free Software Movement, but it 
can be used for all kinds of copyright protected works and creations. Copy-left 
licences use ‘copyright law, but flips it over to serve the opposite purpose’ 
(Stallman, 1999: 59). Information is placed into the public domain while 
copyright law makes sure that it stays there and cannot be commodified. 
 
Figure 3: Copy-left Logo 
 
  
 
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Copyleft.svg (Public Domain) 
 
For some this radical move went too far, leading to the emergence of more 
flexible – or rather more restrictive – licenses. For example, Open Source 
licenses4 are somewhat different from the GPL in that they restrict what you 
can actually do with the material, while GPL leaves the user free to do what 
s/he wants with the licensed material, except commodifying it (Stallman, 
2007). Open source licenses are generally seen to be more business friendly 
(Söderberg, 2002). Likewise, Creative Commons’ licenses, co-developed by 
Lessig (2003), enables authors to impose a variety of restrictions on work 
placed in the public domain, they can choose whether they allow sharing, 
commercial use, and the creation of derivatives from the original or not. 
 
It is, however, a misconception to think that the Copyleft/Open Source 
movement somehow operates beyond or outside the logic, regime and 
ideology of copyright protection. On the contrary, one of the strengths of 
Stallman and others is precisely that they remain within a fairly legalistic 
framework, which is helpful in a context where – often unassumingly – 
consumers sign legal contracts with content producers when purchasing or 
accessing cultural products.  
 
Nevertheless, this strictly legalistic approach contrasts with the more 
normative and sociological position taken by Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and 
Oberholzer and Strumpf (2007) foregrounding the societal benefits of 
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anonymous file-sharing, regardless of the legal implications of this. Two 
citizenship models clearly clash here – citizenship as a legal status with rights 
and obligations, governed by the rule of law versus cultural and political 
citizenship, where citizens have the right to resist, to fundamentally challenge 
laws and to refuse to abide by them legitimised by public interests. From this 
latter perspective laws can easily be perceived to protect the particularistic 
(capitalist) interests rather than serving and protecting the common good and 
copyright laws are a very good example of this.  
 
More radical voices in this debate argue for a complete rejection of the notion 
of copyright all together, rather than to reason from within an IP and/or 
copyright paradigm, as does the Copy-left movement. Rasmus Fleischer, one 
of the co-founders of Swedish Bit-torrent search engine The Pirate Bay and 
author of the blog Copyriot5, rejects copyright outright. He argues that the 
‘vision of copyright utopia is triggering an escalation of technology regulations 
running out of control and ruining civil liberties.’ (Fleischer, 2008: np). He and 
others increasingly point to the price we as a society are paying for ‘upholding 
the phantasm of universal copyright’ (ibid).  
 
Besides this, we are also seeing that some artists have started to emphasise 
the advantages of the participatory culture instead of foregrounding the 
detrimental aspects of it, making good use of its benefits to outweigh the 
costs. Besides mainstream artists such as Prince and Radiohead, underground 
scenes are increasingly developing more innovative ways of creating added 
value other than selling records and CDs. More dance-oriented scenes for 
example thrive on symbolic capital, label recognition and the sharing of 
revenues of DJ-ing and live performances with the labels (Webb, 2007). 
Social media and the participatory culture feed into this and are thus not seen 
as something necessarily negative. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
While music audiences increasingly consider music and other digital content 
immaterial and ephemeral, without real value compared to a physical product, 
the entertainment industries clearly stick to a physical and material world 
where a culture of exchange clashes head on with a collective culture of 
distributed taking and giving. This tension and deepening conflict is 
increasingly unsettling the capitalistic paradigm in the production and 
commercial exploitation of culture.  
 
To some extent digitalisation and the internet have brought us ‘back to the 
future’, to use the title of Robert Zemeckis’ 1985 movie. With some caveats it 
could be argued that to the great dismay of the entertainment industries we 
are slowly returning to an oral era where culture only existed by the grace of 
sharing and the joy it provoked among its audiences, to a time in which 
cultural production had to be in the public domain or it did not exist, had no 
purpose, did not travel far. Poster (2004: 417) asserts that ‘[w]hen cultural 
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objects are digitized, they take on certain characteristics of spoken language’ 
and as we know ‘[t]he model of consumption does not fit practices of speech 
or singing’. This is a pertinent point, salient in relation to music in particular 
and concurrent with the analysis developed above. The question that arises 
then is whether this is necessarily such a bad thing?  
 
As is apparent from the analysis above, opinions on this are starkly divided. 
From the perspective of the music industry and some artists file sharing is 
clearly detrimental and their claims are supported by most econometric 
studies. From the perspective of users and society, file sharing can be 
articulated as highly beneficial to a participatory culture, strengthening the 
public domain, facilitating access for the many to an immense variety of 
cultural products, providing exposure and symbolic capital to artists, at times 
even serendipitously and a potent marketing tool for musicians big and small.  
 
The point made here is that the genie is out of the bottle. It is becoming ever 
more clear that the music industry will never be able to fully exploit the 
advantages of the networked participatory culture while it is at the same time 
engaged in high profile efforts to contain, curtail and/or destroy that very 
same culture. They cannot engage fully in the emerging participatory culture, 
but neither are they able to fully control, let alone destroy, the practices they 
criminalise. One way out of this Catch22 is for the music industry to also 
become a participant. Maybe the time has come for the music industry to 
reconsider its hostile position towards the copyright users and approach them 
as fans and potential consumers rather than as criminals, in similar ways as 
quite a number of artists have started doing. 
 
However, a less romantic and more dystopian option is that the 
entertainment industries, driven by the vast interests they represent and the 
determined will to counter all fundamental challenges to the current 
ownership-regime, will continue to fight the copyright users and the most 
frightening way to do this is through monitoring the online activities of all 
internet users, potentially through deep-packet inspection technology 
(Anderson, 2007). How else would internet service providers be able to detect 
and report persistent ‘misuse’? And how persistent does persistent misuse 
have to be before we get reported? What other categories of misuse might be 
added to downloading and sharing digital content?  
 
In terms of democracy, privacy and civil liberties it remains a daunting 
perspective to envisage a future in which a multiplicity of private little digital 
big brothers will be monitoring our online behaviour in every detail looking for 
all kinds of misuses, ultimately disciplining us if we transgress a certain limit. 
Rather than protect global conglomerates’ interests and restricting access to 
cultural products, a future more in tune with the burgeoning participatory 
culture whilst at the same time providing alternative ways of supporting 
artists and promoting creativity, should be the aim.  
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Endnotes: 
 
 
                                           
1 Corporate authorship refers to ‘work made for hire’, whereby the original author may be 
credited or not, retain moral rights to their creation but ownership and copyright rests with 
the employer or company. For example, publishers hold corporate authorship over academic 
output, academics keep their moral rights and some fair use rights.   
2 This graph represents the year in which legislation was changed but often this has 
retroactive consequences for works created earlier. In reality the rise in copyright terms is 
even more drastic as it appears. While at first copyright terms were absolute and expired 
when an author died, the Berne Convention of 1883 made it possible for descendents and 
others to exert the copyrights for a maximum of 50 years after the author’s death.  
3 See http://www.fact-uk.org.uk or http://www.respectcopyrights.org for examples. 
4 See URL: http://opensource.org/docs/osd 
5 See URL: http://www.copyriot.se  
